## Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board

RE Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2

Docket Number: 05000247

Location: Teleconference

Date: Wednesday, July 15, 2015

Edited by: Douglas Pickett

Work Order No.: NRC-1742 Pages 1-58

NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers
1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 234-4433

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

+ + + + +

10 CFR 2.20 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)

CONFERENCE CALL

RE

INDIAN POINT

+ + + + +

WEDNESDAY

JULY 15, 2015

+ + + + +

The conference call was held, Christopher Miller, Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.

PETITIONER: PAUL BLANCH

PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS

DOUG PICKETT, Petition Manager for 2.206

petition

BENJAMIN BEASLEY

DAVID BEAUL EU

NEAL R. GROSS
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF

DAVID CYLKOWSKI

MICHAEL DUDEK

ANDERS GILBERTSON

JENNIFER HAUSER

MICHAEL McCOPPIN

TERRI SPICHER

RAO TAMMARA

WILLIAM THOMPSON

JOHN WRAY

ROBERT CARPENTER

NRC REGION I STAFF

ARTHUR BURRITT

THOMAS SETZER

PAUL KROHN

1	P+R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	2:41 p.m.
3	MR. PICKETT: Good afternoon. I'd like
4	to thank everybody for attending this meeting. My
5	name is Doug Pickett, and I am the Indian Point
6	project manager. We are here today to allow the
7	Petitioner, Mr. Paul Blanch, assisted by Mr. Richard
8	Kuprewicz of Accufacts Incorporated, to make a second
9	presentation in support of his petition before the
LO	Petition Review Board, also referred to as the PRB.
L1	I am the petition manager for the petition. The PRB
12	chairman is Mr. Christopher Miller.
L3	As part of the PRB review of this
L 4	petition, Mr. Paul Blanch has requested this
L 5	opportunity to address the PRB. In accordance with
L 6	NRC Management Directive 8.11, the purpose of today's
L7	second presentation is to allow the Petitioner to
L 8	comment on the initial recommendation of the PRB and
L 9	to provide additional information that supports the
20	original petition.
21	Today s meeting is scheduled from 2:30 to
22	3:30 p.m. Eastern time. The meeting is being
23	recorded by the NRC Operation Center and will be
24	transcribed by a court reporter. The transcript will
25	become a supplement to the petition, and the

1	transcript will a so be made publicly available. I'd
2	like to open this meeting with introductions. As we
3	go around the room in here, in NRC headquarters, in
4	Rockville, Maryland, please be sure to clearly state
5	your name, your position, and the office that you
6	work for within the NRC. I'll start with myself.
7	I'm Doug Pickett I'm the NRR project manager for
8	Indian Point, and I'm the petition manager for this
9	petition.
10	CHAIR MILLER: My name is Chris Miller.
11	I'm the PRB chairman, and I'll be speaking with you
12	in a minute.
13	MR. BEASLEY: Ben Beasley. I'm a board
14	member. I'm also a branch chief in the Division for
15	Operating Reactor Licensing.
16	MR. CYLKOWSKI: This is David Cylkowski.
17	I'm an attorney in the Office of General Counsel.
18	MR. THOMPSON: William Thompson. I'm a
19	senior special agent with the Office of
20	Investigations.
21	MR. BEAULIEU: I'm David Beaulieu. I'm
22	a board member. I'm the project manager in the
23	Division of Policies and Rule Making.
24	MR. TAMMARA: I'm Rao Tammara. I'm a
25	technical reviewer in NRO [Office of New Reactors].

1	MR. MCCOPPIN: Mike McCoppin, chief of
2	the Radiation Protection and Accident Consequence
3	Branch, Office of New Reactors.
4	MR. GILBERTSON: Anders Gilbertson,
5	reliability and risk analyst, Office of Research.
6	MS. HAUSER: Jenny Hauser, project
7	manager, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing.
8	MR. WRAY: John Wray, along with Robert
9	Carpenter, from the Office of Enforcement.
10	MR. DUDEK: Michael Dudek, acting chief
11	for Project 1 Branch.
12	MR. FICKETT: Okay, we've completed the
13	introductions of the NRC headquarters. At this time,
14	are there any NRC participants from headquarters on
15	the phone?
16	MS. SPICHER: Yes, Terri Spicher from IG
17	[Office of the Inspector General].
18	MR. PICKETT: Okay, are there any NRC
19	participants from the regional office on the phone?
20	MR. SETZER: Yes, this is Tom Setzer,
21	senior project engineer for Project Branch 2.
22	MR. BURRITT: Art Burritt, branch chief
23	responsible for inspections at Indian Point.
24	MR. KROHN: Paul Krohn, branch chief, DRS
25	engineer.

1	MR. PICKETT: Are there any
2	representatives for the Licensee on the phone?
3	MR. WALPOLE: Yes, Doug. It's Bob
4	Walpole, regulatory assurance manager. With me is
5	Steve Prussman, and also John Skonieczny, and we have
6	more people from Entergy listening in.
7	MR. PICKETT: Mr. Blanch and Mr.
8	Kuprewicz, would you please introduce yourselves,
9	along with anyone else assisting you, for the record?
10	MR. BLANCH: At the time, there's no one
11	else. Dave Lochbaum, if he has time, may be calling
12	in.
13	MR. PICKETT: Okay. I'd like to
14	emphasize that we each need to speak clearly and
15	loudly, to make sure that the court reporter can
16	accurately transcribe this meeting. If you have
17	something that you would like to say, please first
18	state your name. At this time, I'll turn this over
19	to the PRB chairman, Chris Miller.
20	CHAIR MILLER: Good afternoon, and thank
21	you for joining s. We appreciate the information
22	we've received so far during this process, as the
23	Board is using the information to make our decision.
24	We look forward to the information you've provided us
25	today. I'd like to first share some background.

1	Section 2.206 of Title 10, Code of Federal
2	Regulations, describes the petition process, the
3	primary mechanism for the public to request
4	enforcement action by the NRC in a public process.
5	As Doug mentioned, our guidance for 2.206 comes from
6	Management Directive 8.11, and that's publicly
7	available. The focus of today's meeting is a follow
8	up to get any information that the Petitioner wants
9	to provide us so that we can make our final decision,
10	and for the Petitioner, with any other support that
11	he has, to provide that information, and any other
12	perspectives on our decision process so far.
13	The public will be provided the
14	opportunity to provide comments regarding the
15	petition.
16	(Telephonic interference.)
17	CHAIR MILLER: The purpose of the
18	meeting is not to provide an opportunity for
19	questioning the PRB's decision so far, but more to
20	gain additional imformation to help support and make
21	the decision. It's not a hearing. It's not an
22	opportunity to go into the merits of, as I said, the
23	decision making, other than to provide additional
24	information into that decision making.
25	We're not going to make a decision in

1	this forum here. We're going to seek information and
2	have a separate PRB meeting to consider the
3	additional information that has been cited.
4	Following this meeting, the Petition Review Board
5	will conduct a deliberation, and the outcome of the
6	internal meeting will be provided to the Petitioner.
7	The PRB typically consists of a chairman, a manager
8	at the senior executive level, a petition manager,
9	and a PRB coordinator. As described in our process,
10	the NRC may ask clarifying questions in order to
11	better understand the Petitioner's presentation and
12	reach our reasoned decision whether to accept or
13	reject the Petitioner's request.
14	At this time, I want to summarize the
15	scope of the petition that we are considering within
16	the Board. On October 15, 2014, Mr. Blanch submitted
17	a 2.206 petition to the NRC regarding the 50.59 Site
18	Hazards Analysis prepared by Entergy, the Licensee
19	for Indian Point. A 50.59 analysis was performed by
20	the Licensee to determine the safety impact on the
21	Indian Point plant due to Spectra Energy's proposed
22	42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline that is planned
23	to traverse a portion of the owner-controlled
24	property at the Indian Point facility.
25	In the petition, Mr. Blanch requests that

the NRC take enforcement action against Entergy, the 1 2 Licensee, for a violation of 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, for providing inaccurate or 3 information in the 50.59 Site Hazards 4 incomplete 5 In violation of 10 CFR [Code of Federal Appendix B -- that's the quality 6 Regulations | 50, 7 assurance criteria -- they're relying on a contractor 8 who is not qualified in accordance with Appendix B requirements, who is not qualified in accordance with 9 10 Entergy's quality assurance program, and as a result, 11 was not qualified to perform an analysis for such a 12 significant safety-related issue in violation of 10 13 CFR 50.59 that's changes, our tests 14 experiments chapter -- for failing to perform the 15 necessary safety evaluation requirements. 16 The Petitioner supplemented his petition number that 17 with of documents address 18 heed for an independent assessment

following: the pipeline, the assumed three-minute of the proposed closure time for the pipeline isolation valves, the impact of the proposed West Point Partners high-voltage, direct-current transmission deficiencies with the NRC's Independent Confirmatory Blast Analysis, including the status use of the ALOHA computer code, and improprieties by the NRC staff.

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

1 The latter concern has been forwarded to the NRC 2 Inspector General's office. 3 Allow me to discuss the NRC activities to There's been a number of communications with 4 date. 5 Mr. Blanch, but 1et me highlight the ones that are 6 pertinent to this process. On January 28th, the 7 Petitioner, with the assistance of Mr. Richard 8 Kuprewicz, of Accufacts, made their first 9 presentation before the PRB. On April 28th, 10 Petitioner informed was that the initial 11 recommendation of the PRB was to reject the petition 12 the basis that the NRC staff has previously 13 reviewed and resolved the issues identified in the 14 petition. 15 Subsequently, the petitioner was 16 offered, and accepted, second opportunity а There's just a couple of final 17 address the PRB. 18 things and I'll wrap up. As a reminder for the 19 participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as this will help us in the preparation 20 of the meeting transcript that will be made publicly 21 22 available, just Like the last transcript was made 23 available. 24 At the end of the meeting, members of the 25 public may provide comments regarding the petition

1	and ask questions about the 2.206 petition process.
2	However, as discussed in the opening, the purpose is
3	to provide information that helps the board render a
4	decision, not necessarily on the merits or agreement
5	with the decision making so far. Mr. Blanch and Mr.
6	Kuprewicz, with that being said, I'll turn it over to
7	you to provide additional information you believe the
8	PRB should consider as part of this decision. Thank
9	you very much.
10	MR. BLANCH: Okay, thank you. This is
11	Paul Blanch. Can you hear me?
12	CHAIR MILLER: Yes, we can, very clear.
13	MR. BLANCH: I believe that you made a
14	statement at the beginning relative to Management
15	Directive 8.11 that said I'm not allowed to ask
16	questions. Is that an accurate portrayal of your
17	statement?
18	MR. FICKETT: The purpose of today's
19	meeting, according to the Management Directive, is
20	for you to comment on the initial recommendation of
21	the PRB,
22	(Telephonic interference.)
23	petition, and to provide additional
24	information.
25	MR. BLANCH: I'm not sure I heard an
	NEAL R GROSS

1	answer to my question. Am I allowed to have a
2	dialogue and ask questions and receive answers from
3	the NRC?
4	MR. PICKETT: No, you are not.
5	MR. BLANCH: And could you tell me where
6	in 8.11 it says that?
7	MR. PICKETT: It doesn't say that in as
8	many words, but it's clear the purpose of the meeting
9	is for you to provide additional information in
10	support of your position.
11	MR. BLANCH: Again, this is a primary
12	point. The Management Directive says the NRC can ask
13	questions, the Licensee can ask questions, but it
14	does not preclude
15	(Telephonic interference.)
16	I guess what I'm hearing is I'm not
17	allowed to ask any questions of a regulator who
18	supposedly serves the public and the environment.
19	CHAIR MILLER: This is Chris Miller, Mr.
20	Blanch. I think what you're hearing is we're trying
21	to have an efficient process here. What we're trying
22	to do is get through and hear the additional
23	information that the Board has to consider. If you
24	have clarifying questions to say, "I'm not really
25	sure what you meant by in your decision to date," or

1	whatever, and that helps, and then you say, "Here's
2	my information related to that," that might be
3	useful.
4	We don't have the purpose of this meeting
5	to have a dialogue on whether or not, for example, a
6	particular calculation is accurate or not, but if you
7	want to provide more and say, "I didn't understand
8	how you got to that assumption. Let me tell you what
9	my take on the calculation is. I'd like you to look
10	at this," that would be useful. I think if we stray
11	from that too far, we're not going to get through
12	your additional information for the Board to
13	consider.
14	MR. BLANCH: I respectfully disagree,
15	and there are some absolutely vital questions that I
16	need responses to determine whether Entergy is
17	making accurate statements, and whether the NRC is
18	making accurate statements. There's a question I
19	tried to ask before. Could you tell me who from OI,
20	Office of Investigation, is there, and who from the
21	Inspector General s office is there?
22	MR. THOMPSON: This is Will Thompson from
23	the Office of Investigations.
24	MR. BLANCH: Thanks, Will.
25	MS. SPICHER: And Terri Spicher from IG.

1	MR. BLANCH: Hi, Terri. Nice to talk to
2	you again. My inderstanding is I cannot ask any
3	questions. Is that a good portrayal?
4	CHAIR MILLER: I think you just asked
5	some questions. As they help you provide us
6	information, and we'll ask you if we need clarifying
7	information, but the purpose of the call is for you
8	to give us information, so that we have more to make
9	our decision on.
10	MR. BLANCH: This is why I wanted a
11	dialogue. Let me just Rick, I'll introduce you
12	in one second, if you can bear with me.
13	MR. KUPREWICZ: No problem.
14	MR. BLANCH: Here's my first statement,
15	ladies and gentlemen. My petition alleged that
16	Entergy provided inaccurate and incomplete
17	information to the NRC. Not only was the information
18	provided inaccurate, it was materially false with
19	respect to the three-minute closure time. Material
20	in that first place approval of the AIM [Algonquin
21	Incremental Market] project on this false information
22	supplied by Entergy and its consultants.
23	This alone should be a firm basis for
24	granting my petition. These facts are discussed in
25	the NRC's internal email dated April 27, 2015. The

NRC, in defense  $\phi$ f Entergy, recalculated the impact 1 2 of prolonged gas discharge by modifying its equations 3 for the PIR [potential impact radius]. This is the second time Enterdy has been exposed for making false 4 5 statements to a regulatory agency. I have further follow-up questions on 6 7 My second statement, and then Rick can take that. 8 The NRC has threatened the safety of more than 20 million residents and the infrastructure of the 9 10 greater New York metropolitan area, and is risking 11 trillions of dollars of damage, and possibly the U.S. 12 economy, by basing its safety assessment on 13 calculation that was recently obtained from the NRC This new information confirms that this 14 under FOIA. 15 NRC "calculation", which was partially handwritten, 16 unapproved, undated, unsigned, used fictitious, unsupported 17 and assumptions. This 18 calculation supported the FERC [Federal Energy 19 Regulatory Commission] approval of the AIM project in the transportation of thousands of pounds of 20 21 equivalent across and in the vicinity of the nuclear 22 power plant. 23 This back-of-the-envelope calculation -- as I say, handwritten -- which misled 2.4 25 congressional representatives, misled FERC, and that

misled the general public, must be invalidated, and 1 2 independent, transparent, structured an risk 3 assessment, as outlined in OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration 29 CFR, methodology must 4 5 be undertaken. With that, I will -- I have a long, long list of questions which the NRC won't respond 6 7 to, and I'm going to turn it over to Mr. Kuprewicz. 8 Rick.

> MR. KUPREWICZ: Thank you. You can't see me, and I cam't see you, so that may sometimes cause for pauses in our discussion while someone's trying to transcribe here. I'm going to focus my analysis comments on the related to the transmission pipeline rupture and the resulting impact associated with that. I want to first say that I'm going to honor the CEII [critical infrastructure information] non-disclosure agreement I signed under the FERC providence, so please, all parties, respect my obligation to not disclose certain critical energy information covered by these agreements. Those agreements, however, I must state catedorically, do not prevent me from information readily in the public commenting on domain. Based on that and information that I studied that is public, my filing observations regarding the

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

analysis concerning the 42-inch gas pipeline rupture in proximity or close proximity to the Indian Point nuclear power plant are as follows.

I reviewed a series of rupture analysis statements concerning the AIM 42-inch transient pipeline rupture mear the Indian point plant. These analyses include the most recent FOIA study that Paul just recently mentioned. I've got to come to the conclusion that they do not represent the transient dynamics associated with a 42-inch gas transmission rupture should it fail near the Indian Point nuke plant.

For example, based extensive on experience, pipe fracture mechanics will demonstrate that gas transmission pipeline ruptures are always full-bore ruptures, even buried. Pressure drop will not be a timely indicator of pipe rupture, even for a 42-inch pipeline. Assumptions about closure within three minutes to cut off gas flow near the plant are lunscientific. Α unrealistic and further analysis conclusion that a rupture release of one hour on the 42 inch pipeline does not impact the nuke plant needs further explanations, as it makes no sense for this system. The above key assumptions, as stated in agency studies, ignore proximity to a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

compressor station upstream and ignore system dynamics associated with a gas transmission pipeline rupture that increases gas releases well above pipeline flow before the rupture.

Quite simply, agency studies are violating the basic laws of science concerning gas pipeline rupture and associated forces that result in massive cratering, pipe shrapneling, and violate the science associated with such releases, especially a 42-inch pipeline. It is not that hard to set up a base case for transient rupture analysis near the nuke facility for this gas transmission system.

appears that various agencies Ιt attempting to dismiss risk as low when gas pipeline rupture may drive the nuke facility to non-safe shutdown in a highly sensitive area. Agency studies create the appearance of risk management tampering to project agency decision and raise the question, Are involved agencies capable of performing a scientifically heutral study for such a sensitive issue? This just isn't that hard near the plant. Lastly, I must comment that a truly independent safety analysis should be performed, subject to a reasonable open peer review. Security claims should permitted not be to shelter malfeasance in

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

scientific method involving incomplete risk analysis 1 2 for such a highly sensitive infrastructure. 3 thank you for your patience in introducing my 4 comments today. 5 MR. BLANCH: This is Paul Blanch. thank you so much for your valued statements. 6 7 following up, Rick has considerable experience in 8 pipeline dynamics, pipeline explosions, 9 investigations, national transportation board, all credentials. 10 kinds of The Nuclear Regulatory 11 Commission has no one whose name I have seen that has 12 any credentials, published documentation, national 13 committees, related to gas dynamics and pipeline 14 transportation. 15 We know that а Mr. Tammara did 16 paperwork study on Calvert Cliffs, Cove Point, but this was a stud $\psi$ , no real experience. 17 consultant, Mr. David Allen, conducted a paperwork 18 19 no documented experience. study, The NRC has considerable expertise in nuclear safety; however, 20 21 has expertise in qas line investigations, no 22 ruptures, dynamics, and response times and emergency 23 response to such. Given a vote, I would put my money on Mr. Kuprewicz's opinions, rather than the opinions 2.4 25 of a paid consultant by Entergy, who was told to come

1	up with an outcome, and from a consultant or from an
2	engineer with Entergy, who used to work for another
3	contractor, who has no documented experience on
4	pipeline dynamics.
5	We have a significant risk here, and we
6	desperately need an independent risk assessment,
7	using established OSHA procedures. I have 20
8	questions. Is it even worth discussing the
9	questions, or are you just going to say, "No comment"?
10	I will be submitting these questions to the NRC in
11	writing anyway, but I expect some type of non-answer
12	to the questions, as has happened before.
13	MR. PICKETT: Paul, this is Doug Pickett
14	here. I would appreciate you sending those questions
15	to me.
16	MR. BLANCH: Okay, I am going to ask the
17	questions. My first question is what justification
18	does the NRC have for modifying the equation for the
19	distance in Reg Guide 1.97 by throwing in a factor
20	that is undefined?
21	CHAIR MILLER: Paul, this is Chris
22	Miller. Those kinds of questions we don't
23	necessarily have the people here to discuss it or to
24	weigh in to the merits of it. I don't think that's
25	going to get us through the commentary or the

1	questioning and information period. I think it might
2	be more productive if we ask the questions of what is
3	represented so that we can get more information based
4	on what, for example, Mr. Kuprewicz said and what you
5	said. But yes, that question wouldn't be one that
6	we'd entertain in this forum.
7	MR. BLANCH: Okay, according to the NRC,
8	we, the public, are your customers. As a customer,
9	if I go into a store or go to buy something, or an
10	auto dealer, if I want to ask a question, I expect an
11	answer. Again, have 20-some questions. Do you
12	want me to read off I'll just read off the
13	questions. If you think they
14	CHAIR MILLER: What would be useful is
15	if you would send those questions in to us
16	(Simultaneous speaking).
17	MR. BLANCH: I'd like to read the
18	questions.
19	CHAIR MILLER: (Simultaneous speaking)
20	with the right people, so that the right people could
21	get the answers. Then you could get accurate answers
22	to your questions.
23	MR. BLANCH: I'd like to ask the
24	questions, such as the members of the public can hear
25	what my concerns are with respect to nuclear safety.

If you choose to answer them, fine. 1 If you choose 2 1, NRC's ignore them, let us know. No. 3 conclusions on isplation times and blast radius are 4 contradicted by lits own document references 5 historical experience documents by the National Transportation Safety Board. 6 7 The NRC has ignored the requirements of for risk analysis. 8 10 CFR 192.935 The NRC and 9 Entergy have misrepresented closure times -- what I'm talking about, from the time of the accident to the 10 11 time the gas flow terminates. This is a major, major 12 concern stated in a proposed rejection letter. The 13 NRC totally relinquished has its exclusive 14 responsibility for nuclear safety to the Department 15 of Transportation. 16 How can they do that? The Atomic Energy forbids that. For example, they trust 17 Department of Transportation to ensure those valves 18 19 will close, that there's proper redundancy, that the condition of the 63-year-old pipe is not degraded, 20 21 such that it's going to rupture within the next year 22 Hust don't know. I don't think the or next day. We 23 So in essence, the NRC has turned over its responsibility for nuclear safety and protecting 2.4 25 the public to the Department of Transportation, and

we know the recent history of the Department 1 2 Transportation. line rupture in Α qas of 3 pipelines Arkansas, Spectra's in crossing the 4 Arkansas River, recently required more than 24 hours 5 to detect, which totally contradicts the reference by the NRC to Spectra's Resource Report No. 11. 6 7 The NRC employed unauthorized computer 8 programs to calculate risk, flow, vapor gas 9 jet fire explosion. explosion, They used ALOHA, which is prohibited for the use in this type of event. 10 11 The NRC, and I'm referring to Reg Guide 1.91, has 12 changed and misused its own calculations. 13 Calculations have been conducted by inexperienced NRC 14 and Entergy persons. The NRC failed to consider 15 historic ruptures in its time to isolate and 16 terminate gas flow. The NRC continues to ignore the potential 17 impact of vapor | louds. The NRC fails to consider 18 19 the possibility of flammable gasses entering 20 plant and control rooms, the same type of events that 21 secondary contributed explosions of the to the 22 containment Fukushima. Whether that's at 23 possibility or not, I'm not sure. I'm just saving it was not considered. The NRC provides misleading 2.4

responses to direct questions on the content of a

1 fuel oil tank. That's a significant issue. 2 asked three times, from Neal Sheehan to Doug Pickett 3 to Scott [Stewart], senior resident inspector, do those large, multi-million-gallon tanks contain any 4 5 flammable materials which are inside the impact zone? All I get is statements, "To the best of my knowledge, 6 7 we don't think so " 8

I cannot get a definitive answer whether multi-million-gallon those large tanks contain flammable material? No direct answer. Spectra proposes to enhance new pipelines while ignoring 63-year-old existing pipelines within the Indian Point property. Neither the Licensee, nor the NRC Indian Point operations -- personnel are not aware or have any procedure to combat and combat and impose any requirements on the piping or transmission qas line system within shouldn't say protected area, protected -- I owner-controlled area of Indian Point.

The NRC refused to issue an informal letter to me proposing to reject my petition. The NRC issued to the Licensee and the world a letter specifically addressed to me, dated June 29, 2015, but for some reason -- and this still holds true today, unless it's in the mail -- the NRC has ignored

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

1	even sending that letter to me. I got it from a
2	friend. What kind of game is the NRC playing here
3	that they won't sign letters, they'll address letters
4	to me, but they won't send them either by email or by
5	snail mail? My ottom line is we desperately need
6	congressional and public support and demand the NRC
7	sanction or require an independent and I do mean
8	independent risk assessment of the gas line at
9	Indian Point. I think those are the majority of the
10	questions. There could be more.
11	MR. BEASLEY: Mr. Blanch, this is Ben
12	Beasley of the NRC. It would be very helpful for us,
13	when you send us your questions, that you send as
14	much specific information as you can. I didn't take
15	a lot of notes, but on things like you identified
16	contradictions at that point, 191. If you could give
17	us some specific information on where you see the
18	contradictions, that would be very helpful for us to
19	give you a fuller response.
20	MR. BLANCH: I sent that information to
21	Doug Pickett today. It outlines exactly the equation
22	that for some reason the NRC decided to modify to get
23	its desired outcome.
24	MR. BEASLEY: Okay, thank you.
25	MR. BLANCH: Without any justification,

1 whatsoever.

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

MR. BEASLEY: Thank you. The request
was the more information you give us, the better we'll
be able to give you a faster response.

MR. BLANCH: I'm just talking about your own documents, not my documents. You've got them Take a look at all the FOIAs that I filed and all. responses to the FOIAs. Some of them are different. I haven't seen any communication where the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has even given you any flow diagrams to perform an independent risk assessment of the pipeline system. We don't know what valves have to be closed, whether there are I assume there have to be multiple multiple valves. valves. We, in the nuclear industry, require redundancy. We require inspections. We quality assurance. How can you delegate responsibility to the Department of Transportation and rely on them to protect the health and safety of This is inexcusable to me. millions of residents?

CHAIR MILLER: Okay, Mr. Blanch, we have those questions and statements that you provided. Is there other material you want Board? provide the Ι know that there's some questions that the Board would want to ask you and

1	Mr. Kuprewicz, but before we do that, I wanted to see
2	if there's any other information that you have, that
3	you'd like to provide?
4	MR. BLANCH: That's the primary
5	information that I have, but I'd like to have you
6	ladies and gentlemen ask Mr. Kuprewicz, with his
7	numerous years of recognized gas line investigations
8	and studies if you have any questions for him.
9	CHAIR MILLER: We will do that. If I
LO	could just ask you one question related this is
L1	Chris Miller. I want to ask you one question related
L2	to your in your list of questions and statements
13	about your June 29th letter. Do you want us to send
L 4	you an email I'm assuming that the hard copy did
L5	not come to you. Would you like an email of
L 6	the with an attachment of that letter? We can
L7	provide that?
L 8	MR. BLANCH: No, I don't need it. I
L 9	obviously got it from a friend. It's just very
20	upsetting to me that you have a signed letter, dated
21	letter, and I'll give you the benefit of the doubt
22	that maybe it was a mistake, but given all the other
23	evasive statements I've received from the NRC, it
24	just seems to be a pattern. That question about do
25	the tanks contain flammable material, I can't get a

1	straight answer from the NRC. When I get an answer,
2	to the best of my knowledge. I'm not a politician.
3	I'm an engineer. I don't take kindly to political
4	answers. This is from your Office of Public Affairs.
5	I really, really I've said it 100 times.
6	Everyone's saying it. We need an independent risk
7	assessment. We need to sit down.
8	I've asked Senator Gillibrand's office to
9	see if her office could arrange a meeting between
10	myself and Entergy to try to resolve our differences
11	of opinion. I haven't heard back yet. I don't have
12	any questions. I d certainly like answers sometime.
13	I could restate these questions, but I read them as
14	I had written them. They were very brief. I'm
15	pretty much done. I'm not overly pleased at what I'm
16	hearing, especially on the question answering.
17	CHAIR MILLER: On that one issue with the
18	letter, we'll go ahead and send an attached letter,
19	assuming that's the mail that hasn't arrived there
20	yet or something. I don't know what happened. It
21	certainly was inadvertent. If the June 29th letter
22	didn't arrive by July 14th, I don't know what
23	happened, but we'll send you an electronic version.
24	You should be able to get that shortly.
25	(Simultaneous speaking.)

1	CHAIR MILLER: If you had any
2	more before we go on to Mr. Kuprewicz and I'll
3	ask the rest of the team you made an initial
4	statement about false statements that were made
5	to fictitious false assumptions. I'm wondering
6	is that something that we can get from you the
7	specifics of that, or is that something you can
8	provide us when you provide your list of questions,
9	or is that something that Mr. Kuprewicz can provide
10	your beliefs on those? That would help us out a lot,
11	as well.
12	MR. BLANCH: I had, last Friday, a very
13	long conversation, very cordial and professional
14	conversation with Mr. Art Burritt, who I think is a
15	senior NRC person on here. I think we will both
16	agree it was a very good conversation. We got into
17	some of these questions last week about probability
18	assumptions and the basis for that.
19	Again, I told Mr. Burritt last week that
20	there were errors where Indian Point is operating
21	outside of their design basis with respect to the
22	existing gas lines because your gas expert said that
23	a failure of these 63-year-old gas lines is not
24	feasible, which is, to me, a false statement. That's
25	one example. There's many examples throughout these

1	documentations that I got within FOIA. Another false
2	statement is that the gas rupture, if it pursues,
3	will not significantly increase the blast radius,
4	inconsistent with the equation in Reg Guide 1.91. I
5	don't know how one comes to that and how one can make
6	these statements that, on the surface, appear to be
7	inaccurate and false.
8	CHAIR MILLER: Okay, I've got those two
9	listed. If you have any more, it would be useful if
10	you provide them with the other questions you're
11	providing. That would be useful to us.
12	MR. BLANCH: I've got 100 people in the
13	room here. With respect to that June 29th letter,
14	don't bother sending it. I have it obviously. I've
15	gotten it from numerous people. I don't care. It's
16	just an example of how the NRC is treating us and
17	ignoring us and not giving us direct answers to direct
18	questions and not signing documents, not dating
19	documents. It seems like they're almost playing a
20	game with me, and nuclear safety is not a game to me.
21	CHAIR MILLER: It's not a game with us
22	either, and we have a very thorough process for
23	putting things in our ADAMS [Agencywide Documents
24	Access and Management System] system, so they're made
25	publicly available. I take concern when somebody

1 says that something is not appropriately sent or documented or whatever, so we'll make sure you get 2 3 another copy of that letter, and that the information is available when it's able to be put in the public 4 5 space. MR. BLANCH: I tend to disagree with you 6 7 that you have procedures in place to assure safety when the NRC doesn't even have a procedure for doing 8 9 safety-related calculations and does not have 10 procedure that it quality assurance imposes 11 I see a calculation, which I call a licensees. When 12 back-of-the-envelope calculation, with handwriting 13 in it, I would be put in jail if I submitted that to 14 the NRC if I were working for a licensee. I disagree 15 with your statement that we are concerned about 16 safetv. Ι believe more concerned about the continuance of the nuclear industry. 17 I'm done. 18 CHAIR MILLER: Thank you. Let me ask 19 the Board, is there any more questions for Mr. Blanch 20 before we move on to questions for Mr. Kuprewicz? 21 Okay, anything from the regional people or other No? 22 headquarters people that want to ask a question of 23 Mr. Blanch? 2.4 PARTICIPANT: No thank you, Chris. 25 CHAIR MILLER: Okay, we'll move on to

2 MR. BEASLEY: I did have one. This is Ben Beasley. 3 Mr. Kuprewicz, you said that it makes no sense that a release from the gas lines -- release 4 5 and explosion would not affect the plant. I just was curious if you have some test data or some examples 6 7 of where there was a blast and how far the one psi 8 pressure wave extended from that blast? If you have some data like that that you could send to us that 9 would be informative, it would be helpful just to 10 11 back up your statement that it makes no sense there. 12 MR. MUPREWICZ: Let me clarify here. 13 What I think I said -- maybe I'll have to go back and 14 look at the transcript -- is that the analysis had 15 indicated that a pne-hour gas release is just going 16 to be as effective as the early gas release. That 17 no sense because the mass releases are 18 substantially different. As to whether or not it 19 affects the plant, I don't know that. That's 20 want everybody to be and clearly 21 dan't make that analysis because I understood -- I don't know the details of the plant. 22 23 All I can tell you is the statements I'm 24 and reading in the analysis and studies hearing 25 related to gas pipeline rupture, on

questions for Mr. | Kuprewicz.

1	pipeline that ruptures at this point, in this
2	proximity to the muke facility, has no justification
3	in the scientific method. There's the difference.
4	What I would clarify is you need to get a hold of
5	somebody who really understands gas transmission
6	pipeline rupture. They can do a transient
7	analysis okay, the pipeline ruptured at Second 0.
8	It's now Minute 2, Minute 3, Minute 4, Minute 60.
9	This is a mass release, and you need to decide when
10	does it will it ignite or not? Will it detonate
11	or not? Then assign probabilities to those, if you
12	wish.
13	But regardless of the probability, if you
14	have a significant, large enough gas release, and it
15	does detonate, will it affect the plant, and more
16	importantly, not so much affect the plant, but will
17	it affect the plant's ability to shut down in a
18	failsafe mode? That's always been the question I've
19	had. I'm not trying to answer that. Am I clear?
20	MR. BEASLEY: Yes, I guess I was just
21	interested the way you said it, I thought you might
22	have some specific information about a blast radius
23	that was larger than was calculated by our analysis,
24	but it sounds like you don't have anything specific.
25	MR. KUPREWICZ: No, you're correct. My

1	analysis, based on what I see of the plant
2	structures again, I'm not the detailed expert on
3	your structures at Indian Point is my suspicion
4	would be while blast radius would do a lot of damage,
5	it may not affect the plant's ability to failsafe
6	shutdown. Blast is probably not the controlling
7	factor in this analysis. It's heat radiation.
8	MR. BEASLEY: Yes, our analysis did
9	calculate the heat flux, also. Again, I just was
10	interested if you had something specific that you
11	were thinking about.
12	MR. KUPREWICZ: No. To be fair to you,
13	I would have to do a specific calculation for a
14	specific site, and I have not done that, just looking
15	at the general maps. I haven't reached that
16	conclusion. My suspicion would be your nuclear
17	reactors, they'll survive blast, no big deal, but
18	it's the auxiliary failsafe equipment that you have
19	to be sure someone's performed an analysis on. My
20	experience would tell me most likely heat radiation
21	is your biggest risk.
22	MR. BEASLEY: Okay, thank you.
23	CHAIR MILLER: Yes, appreciate that.
24	MR. FICKETT: This is Doug Pickett and
25	I'd like to ask Mr. Blanch if you could provide as

1	much detail in your concerns, that would be
2	appreciate, of course. One thing I wrote down that
3	you said
4	MR. BLANCH: Could you speak up a little
5	louder please?
6	MR. PICKETT: Okay, I was asking Mr.
7	Kuprewicz if he could provide as much detail as you
8	could on the individual concerns that he mentioned in
9	his statement. That would be beneficial to the
10	Board. One of the things I wrote down for Mr.
11	Kuprewicz, I wrote down risk management tampering.
12	That certainly sounds like an impropriety by the
13	staff, if you could talk a little bit more about that.
14	MR. KUPREWICZ: That's a general
15	observation I've seen in too many criminal
16	investigations lately that I've had to assist in. I
17	don't like using that word in public very often, nor
18	am I implying that's the situation here. But we tend
19	to find, in the application of risk management
20	techniques, which have become a more favorable effort
21	in regulatory processes, that sometimes we see
22	processes where the science is either ignored or not
23	applied appropriately, such that it drives to a
24	pre-ordained conclusion.
25	So I make that statement with my

1	impression is get the impression that someone's
2	driving towards a decision to site the facility. I
3	can't reach that conclusion, whether that's fair or
4	not. All I can look at is the scientific principles
5	related to gas pipeline ruptures and say holy crying
6	out loud, they're not capturing the scientific
7	principles here. Again, these are transient
8	releases. They're a little more complex, but they're
9	not that hard to do if someone knows what they're
10	doing.
11	MR. PICKETT: Okay, thank you.
12	MR. BLANCH: This is Paul Blanch again.
13	Another one of the documents that I got under FOIA
14	actually shocked me when it said that there's 376,000
15	kilograms of natural gas released during the first
16	minute, and then a couple hundred thousand for the
17	next hour. That's a phenomenal amount of gas. When
18	I look at 376,000 kilograms of gas in a minute, that's
19	close to a nuclear weapon. Within about three
20	minutes, the energy released would be close to that
21	of a nuclear weapon.
22	Natural gas on a per-pound or
23	per-kilogram basis contains ten times more energy
24	than TNT. We're not talking about a small break
25	here, with a small amount of energy being released.

1	This is not and I realize that TNT versus natural
2	gas is quite a pit different because of the time
3	involved, but we re not talking a small amount of
4	gas. This is a very serious safety issue. If the
5	NRC wants to reject my position and think this is the
6	end of it, it will not be the end of it. I'm done.
7	CHAIR MILLER: Thank you. Hang on one
8	second. Let me just one more question for Mr.
9	Kuprewicz. This is Chris Miller with the NRC. You
10	looked at our analysis, and I realize you didn't
11	do calculate the blast radius and that and the
12	heat flux that came similar to what we did. My
13	question was I thought I heard in your discussion
14	that you did question the amount of gas that we the
15	gas flow that we used in our calculation.
16	I was wondering if you had any numbers
17	that you used, or you think were more appropriate
18	than the numbers we used to calculate the gas flow
19	that leads to the mass the kilograms and the energy
20	potential that we re talking about here?
21	MR. KUPREWICZ: To answer your question,
22	the answer is no, but based on a wealth of
23	investigation and other calculations on other
24	pipelines, I've got to tell you a 42-inch, when it
25	ruptures, is going to release I'm not going to

1 jump to Paul's numbers, but there are going to be a 2 lot of numbers. They're going to be big numbers. 3 When I hear thinds like we can cut off the gas flow within three minutes, that's clearly a violation of 4 5 the laws of thermodynamics. Even if you close the valves within three minutes, it's not going to cut 6 7 But, and that -- my experience off the gas flow. 8 would say this: the credibility tends to go out the 9 window when Ι start seeing statements on key 10 assumptions, and It just may kind of get back to that 11 that was raised, where gee, it looks earlier question 12 like these are kind of lining uр to give 13 pre-ordained answer. Look, just run the transient 14 analysis, make your statements for what they are, and 15 then let them be what they are. Then they'll take 16 you where you need to be. You're going to find that a 42-inch gas 17 18 line is going to release a lot of gas for a long time, 19 and you won't -- by the time you see pressure drop, 20 damage is allready done. It won't be a few 21 minutes. That's just a qualification statement. 22 The details -- rum a transient analysis on a 42-inch 23 pipeline rupture few miles а from gas 24 compression station. They're not going see 25 pressure drop, not for a while.

1	CHAIR MILLER: So we did do the numbers
2	on the flow. I hear you think they may not be
3	accurate (Simultaneous speaking).
4	MR. KUPREWICZ: I'm not here to punish
5	you guys or challenge everything you guys do or make
6	you the bad guys. My function is to be neutral. I'm
7	just saying this. If your calculations didn't look
8	at gas flow going up significantly in the first couple
9	minutes after a pipeline rupture, your approach is
10	probably in error.
11	CHAIR MILLER: Okay, thank you for that.
12	Any other questions for Mr. Kuprewicz? Any more
13	questions from the region or from other headquarters
14	offices?
15	MR. BEASLEY: No, Chris, thank you.
16	CHAIR MILLER: Is there any questions
17	from the pipeline from Entergy, let's put it that
18	way?
19	MR. WALPOLE: No comments from Entergy,
20	Chris.
21	CHAIR MILLER: Okay. We know that there
22	are members that's all that we have for the
23	questions back and forth for the Board, the
24	information the Board would need. We know that there
25	are members of the public invited. I guess I would  NEAL R. GROSS

1	like to include them by saying, are there any members
2	of the public that would like to make a comment or
3	question regarding the process we're using? If you
4	do, again, I'll remind you, back to the beginning,
5	that you need to press star-1, so that the moderator
6	can get you off of mute and into the call. Let's go
7	to that portion of our meeting.
8	MR. BLANCH: I have Linda Puglisi, who's
9	the town supervisor for the Town of Cortlandt, who
10	would like to ask another question. Linda, thank
11	you.
12	MS. PUGLISI: Thank you so much for
13	allowing me to make a statement, and I want to ask a
14	question. I'm the supervisor of the Town of
15	Cortlandt, and Indian Point has been in our town and
16	our Village of Buchanan. The mayor of Buchanan is
17	also here. We've been partnering for two and a half
18	years to fight this Spectra-Algonquin expanded
19	pipeline, from 26 inches to 42 inches, and even more
20	importantly, a point to make, it's a 25 percent
21	increase in pressure.
22	A couple of months ago, there was a fire
23	at a transformer on the Indian Point grounds. I
24	received a phone call on a Saturday night regarding
25	that incident. If this pipeline, 100 feet from

1	Indian Point, was under construction or constructed,
2	God forbid that there was an impact to that gas line.
3	Bottom line here, I will be very simple
4	and clear in my comment and my request. We need your
5	help, NRC, to go to FERC, Federal Energy Regulatory
6	Commission, that has the authority to render a
7	decision on the expanse of this pipeline, and
8	unfortunately they did on March 3, 2015. We got
9	together with State, with our task force, with our
LO	assemblywoman, Sandy Galef, with many other people in
L1	our community and elected officials, and we asked
L2	for to revisit this, and to hear our many, many
L3	concerns and issues. This is one of the most
L 4	important issues, the close proximity to Indian
L 5	Point. We need your help to go to FERC to ask them
L 6	to re-open that premature decision that they made on
L7	March 3rd. Please help us. Thank you.
L8	(Simultaneous speaking.)
L 9	CHAIR MILLER: Paul, do you have other
20	folks?
21	MR. BLANCH: Is there anyone else that
22	would like to make a brief statement to the Nuclear
23	Regulatory Commission? I hate to single people out.
24	There's one lady that would like to make a statement.
25	I'll let her do her own introduction.

1	MAYOR KNICKERBOCKER: Thank you for
2	taking this call. Thank you Paul Blanch. Thank you
3	Sandy Galef. Thank you Linda Puglisi. Thank you
4	everyone in this room. You can hear the questions.
5	We need answers. Oh, I'm Theresa Knickerbocker,
6	mayor of Village of Buchanan. Can you hear me?
7	Hello?
8	CHAIR MILLER: Yes, we can hear you.
9	MAYOR KNICKERBOCKER: Okay, good, just
10	wanted to check. There's a bunch of people in this
11	room. You can hear the concern. I believe Mr.
12	Blanch had a lot of good questions, a lot of good
13	questions, also Dave had excellent questions and
14	comments. We have concerns. We want this to be
15	safe. This is our community. We have to have
16	answers to these questions. I would really, really
17	appreciate this is very difficult, this phone
18	calling thing. I m more of a person one on one. I
19	need to communicate directly.
20	I would really like to ask that when you
21	answer these questions that you come into our
22	community to answer these questions. If you want me
23	to facilitate it at the Village of Buchanan, or I'm
24	sure that Supervisor Puglisi would love to do it in
25	the Town of Cort andt, but we really need to have

1 these questions answered. We need to be assured that 2 this pipeline is safe. 3 We have a nuclear power plant. You guys 4 are in charge of making sure these nuclear power 5 so please, please answer these plants are safe, questions, get answers to these questions, get back 6 7 to this community and assure us that this is safe. 8 Thank you. 9 Okay at this time, MR. BLANCH: we've 10 probably run over a little bit of time, but I 11 appreciate everyone's concern here and at the NRC. 12 think we've accomplished what we needed 13 accomplish during this conversation. Again, 14 bottom line is we still have a lot of questions about 15 nuclear safety, and we desperately need that risk 16 With that, I'm going to end mine, unless the NRC has something they want to finally say. 17 18 CHAIR MILLER: Yes, just a couple of 19 First of all, thank you to quick points. 20 commenters who just presented and to Mr. Kuprewicz 21 Appreciate the discussion and to you, Mr. Blanch. and the information. We will make a Board decision 22 on whether to accept or reject the 2.206 petition and 23 to further discuss, and we'll provide information, 2.4 25 and we'll provide answers back, and we'll provide the

1	court reporting of this transcripts of this call.
2	With that in mind, let me ask the court
3	reporter if there's any additional need for
4	information for the meeting transcript? You may have
5	to do *1, court reporter.
6	MS. SHAPIRO: Hi, this is Geri Shapiro
7	from Senator Gillibrand's office give me some
8	kind of a time line, in terms of now that you've heard
9	the questions raised, when they will be answered
LO	(Telephonic interference.)
L1	time line. The other two is several elected
L2	offices on this phone call. We would like to be able
L3	to get copies of the responses, so that we can get
L 4	the material directly, also.
L 5	CHAIR MILLER: Thank you. This is Chris
L 6	Miller. We certainly will provide that information
L7	if you can identify the other offices that are on
L 8	(Simultaneous speaking).
L 9	MS. SHAPIRO: I would tell you to send
20	them to the entire congressional delegation. I don't
21	know whether they re all on or not. I know we have
22	two of us on from Senator Gillibrand's office. I
23	know that Congresswoman Lowey's office is on. The
24	thing is I guess I wanted the time line and equally
25	important, what do you see as the time line here?

This is Doug Pickett. 1 PICKETT: We 2 need to see the questions from Mr. Blanch and Mr. 3 Kuprewicz. I really can't give you a good estimate 4 right now. We'll have to have an internal meeting 5 with PRB after this, I think in the next few weeks. Then we're going to have to discuss what the time and 6 7 the questions are. We're probably talking a good six 8 weeks. 9 This is Chris Miller. CHAIR MILLER: 10 Doug was laying it out, we have a The process, as 11 couple other things that we have to get. When we get 12 the questions from Mr. Blanch and additional 13 that to consider, information we need 14 we'll -- and we need to get the transcribed report. 15 We'll get the transcribed report out to all parties, 16 and that includes the Board members. Then we'll meet I would expect that's going to be two 17 as a Board. 18 to three weeks out, if not more. Then the Board will 19 make a recommendation. And there's two ways that the Board could say we should accept this 20 21 petition and look at the merits of it and do further 22 information, or the Board could say there's 23 additional information than what was alreadv 2.4 provided, and then we provide a final report on that. 25 But yes, we can't give you an exact time line, but

1	it's a number of weeks out.
2	MS. SHAPIRO: Thank you.
3	MS. WARREN: Good afternoon. My name is
4	Barbara Warren. I'm with Citizens' Environmental
5	Coalition. I guess I'd like to understand did NRC
6	just accept the Entergy evaluation, or did you do an
7	independent evaluation yourselves? Also, did you
8	include real-world information, such as the
9	experience that happened in San Bruno, California
LO	with the exploding pipeline?
L1	MR. BEASLEY: This is Ben Beasley. Yes,
L2	ma'am, we did a confirmatory analysis. We did our
L3	own analysis. We did not just accept the Entergy
L 4	numbers. That is our practice. When a licensee
L 5	sends us information, we confirm it. So we did do a
L 6	complete confirmatory analysis.
L 7	CHAIR MILLER: This is Chris Miller, and
L 8	I'll add on to that. In Region 1, you can let me
L 9	know if you have additional, but what our part in the
20	process for this pipeline is, the NRC part, is to
21	evaluate the Licensee's calculations for whether
22	there's any impact to equipment that's relied upon to
23	safely shut down the plant. They do what is called
24	a 50.59 evaluation. The Licensee did that
25	evaluation. They weren't required to submit to us,

1	but we reviewed that in a separate inspection and
2	provided that input in an inspection report. I think
3	that inspection report was issued sometime in
4	November. Is that right, Region 1?
5	MR. SETZER: Yes, Chris. Hi, this is
6	Tom Setzer. November 7th, in the third-quarter
7	inspection report, that's the integrated report
8	that's the residents' right. That's probably
9	available in there. In a modification sample that
10	we did, we did document the inspection of what you
11	just discussed.
12	MS. WARREN: You did consider the San
13	Bruno situation in your evaluation, where they had
14	trouble finding the valve to shut off the gas?
15	MR. SETZER: No, ma'am, we didn't
16	(Telephonic interference.)
17	specific event. The analysis we did
18	was a conservative analysis that assumes a release.
19	We did do two evaluations, the three-minute release,
20	but it wasn't just three minutes. It assumed a
21	three-minute closure, but the release was longer than
22	that. Then we did a one-hour release, so it was a
23	bounding analysis that we prepared.
24	MR. MCCOPPIN: This is Mike McCoppin.
25	In addition, we also had an independent

1	(Telephonic interference.)
2	there's a peer review to the original
3	reviewer, to confirm his conclusion.
4	MR. BLANCH: Okay, this is Paul Blanch
5	again. I'd just like to make a couple more
6	statements. The intent of my petition was not to
7	take a
8	(Telephonic interference.)
9	against Entergy or the Licensee of
10	Indian Point. The intent of my petition, while it
11	was couched that way, was really intended to assure
12	nuclear safety. I'm not looking for retribution
13	against Indian Point.
14	I think I've made a fairly convincing
15	argument, supported by the NRC documents, that
16	inaccurate, incomplete information was sent to the
17	NRC on a couple of occasions because I believe that
18	to be the case. I think that FERC needs to be
19	informed by the NRC that the NRC's analysis may have
20	been faulty. I would like to know if the NRC will
21	contact FERC and say there's a question related to
22	our analysis, or is it a foregone conclusion the
23	pipeline's going to go ahead?
24	CHAIR MILLER: Yes, this is Chris Miller.
25	Mr. Blanch, the question I believe you have is are we

1	going to contact FERC and tell them that they need to
2	reverse their decision? Is that an accurate
3	restatement?
4	MR. BLANCH: That's pretty accurate.
5	CHAIR MILLER: That's going to be up to
6	what the Board determines once they evaluate the
7	additional information that's provided
8	MR. BLANCH: This could be a year from
9	now?
10	CHAIR MILLER: That's not our time line.
11	That's not our scheduled time line, but it will take
12	some time.
13	MR. BLANCH: Paula Claire has one more
14	question.
15	CHAIR MILLER: Okay.
16	MS. QLAIRE: Hi. My question is oh,
17	Paula Claire. I'm a resident of Garrison, and also
18	a co-founder of the Stop The Algonquin Pipeline
19	Expansion. My question is you talk about the safe
20	shutdown of Indian Point in the event of a pipeline
21	rupture. I'm concerned about what about the
22	containers of spent fuel that are stored there? Are
23	you also considering that as a part of the safe
24	shutdown of the nuclear facility? Because they're
25	highly radioactive. If a rupture occurred, it would

1	seem to me that they would be in jeopardy, especially
2	the ones in the spent fuel pools, which are the
3	majority. So that's my question.
4	MR. PICKETT: Hold on, we're going to
5	pause for just for a second before we respond. This
6	is Doug Pickett speaking. We just got a chance to
7	talk to our reviewer. The residual location is the
8	entity the spent fuel storage canisters. They are
9	rather far away from the pipeline. We have drawings
10	in front of us, and we looked at where we anticipate
11	the one-pound over pressure and the critical heat
12	flux to occur, and it would not approach the entity's
13	canisters. We do not believe it would impact the
14	spent fuel pool spent fuel storage facility at
15	all.
16	MS. CLAIRE: If it affected the switch
17	yard, that affects the cooling of the spent fuel
18	pools.
19	MR. PICKETT: The idea is that the switch
20	yard, if that were taken out, there are emergency
21	diesel generators on site to provide you on-site
22	emergency AC power. That will supply you the cooling
23	to the spent fuel pools.
24	MS. CLAIRE: Okay, so are you saying that
25	the spent fuel would be safe in the event of a
	NEAL R GROSS

1	rupture?
2	MR. PICKETT: That is correct. That's
3	assuming you lose the switch yard, and you would lose
4	off-site power, but it has emergency on-site AC power
5	supplies, in the way of diesel generators, to supply
6	you the critical cooling that you would need for the
7	spent fuel pools.
8	MS. CLAIRE: What about the heat blast
9	that Rick Kuprewicz had mentioned? Wouldn't that be
10	a factor?
11	CHAIR MILLER: This is Chris Miller.
12	The NRC did a look, and I've got the reviewer sitting
13	here with me, so pipe up if I say the wrong thing,
14	but we did a look a couple of times by different
15	people looking at two key things. One is the blast
16	and the pressure wave from any expected blast. That
17	was done by a computer modeling program that we use,
18	and we have used it for our nuclear facility. We've
19	used it for the new reactors that are being built.
20	We used this model to predict gas explosions and heat
21	flux. That model was run and found that it did not
22	affect these related structures needed to cool the
23	reactor itself or the fuel in the spent fuel pools.
24	That was the pressure wave. For the heat flux, the
25	same thing. We could determine those calculations

1	using that computer model that was run on several
2	different occasions found that the heat flux would
3	not be a factor to damage those safety-related
4	components.
5	MS. CLAIRE: I think I would like to see
6	the analysis that was done to address the spent pools
7	in the event of a rupture. Thank you.
8	MR. PORRECO: Hi. Good afternoon, this
9	is Tony Porreco. I'm the court reporter. I have a
10	few questions for Mr. Pickett.
11	CHAIR MILLER: Go right ahead.
12	MR. PORRECO: Mr. Pickett, at the
13	conclusion of the hearing, would you be able to
14	provide me with a list of the about 20 NRC staff
15	members? I just was trying to get everyone's names.
16	MR. PICKETT: Sure, I just send it to
17	court reporters?
18	MR. PORRECO: Yes, can I provide you with
19	an email address?
20	MR. PICKETT: Sure.
21	MR. PORRECO: Sure. Okay, it's P, as in
22	Paul, O-R-R-E-C-O-A at gmail.com.
23	MR. PICKETT: That's C-O-R-R-E-C-O-L?
24	MR. PORRECO: E-C-O-A. A, as in apple,
25	and the first letter is P. P, as in Paul.

1	MR. PICKETT: P-O-R-R-E-C-O-A?
2	MR. PORRECO: Yep, at Gmail.
3	MR. PICKETT: Gmail, okay.
4	MR. PORRECO: Thanks.
5	CHAIR MILLER: At Gmail.
6	MR. PORRECO: Appreciate it.
7	MR. PICKETT: Okay, thank you.
8	MS. BORGIA: It's Catherine Borgia,
9	Westchester County legislator representing parts of
10	Peekskill and Cortlandt. My question is a positive
11	question. Since you are doing this, actually, a
12	little bit, by Mr. Shapiro and Mr. Blanch, I was
13	thinking of this since you are doing a re-look, given
14	today's questions, will there be any level of
15	communication to FERC that this is happening, as they
16	are considering the possible recertification?
17	MR. PICKETT: This is Doug Pickett
18	speaking. We are going to have to look at the
19	questions from Mr. Blanch and Mr. Kuprewicz. We're
20	going to have an internal meeting of the Petition
21	Review Board. We will determine whether or not we
22	need to redo our analysis, and we will not be
23	contacting FERC unless we determine that we have a
24	problem with our own conclusions. So right now, we
25	do not plan on communicating with FERC. We will not

1	do that until we make the determination that we are
2	in error.
3	MR. BLANCH: Okay, we've got to end this,
4	but I've gone one last question from a local resident
5	who will introduce himself and ask the final
6	question. Thank you.
7	MR. VAUGHEY: Yes, hello. My name is
8	Vernard Vaughey, V, as in Victor, A-U-G-H-E-Y. My
9	question hopefully is simple. Since it appears that
LO	the NRC will not send something to FERC to suspend
L1	the project, will the NRC consider, based upon all
L2	these questions and these unknowns, sending a request
13	to FERC to not issue a notice to proceed for any of
L 4	the work in Cortlandt until the NRC has their
L5	determination made, be it three weeks, three months,
L 6	or three years?
L7	CHAIR MILLER: This is Chris Miller.
L8	We're discussing I understand the gist of your
L 9	question, and we're just discussing options of what
20	we could do to discuss the situation with FERC so
21	we could
22	MR. KUPREWICZ: I don't mean to
23	interrupt this is Rick Kuprewicz. I'm going to
24	have to sign off because I've got another commitment.
25	Paul, you'll fill me in later? Thank you.

1 MR. BLANCH: Thank you very much, Rick. 2 VAUGHEY: There's MR. no sense in 3 starting the work on this if the NRC has questions. There is not one rationale for FERC to allow work to 4 5 commence if there's a possibility of there being any changes or revisions. That's my reason for asking 6 7 that the NRC request FERC not issue a notice to 8 proceed on the work in Cortlandt. 9 CHAIR MILLER: This is Chris Miller. 10 talked about it, and what we can do -- I will share 11 information that - we haven't been sharing all the 12 parts. We've had a lot of discussions with a lot of 13 agendies, etcetera. We've in been communication with FERC a number of times through 14 15 this process, including talking about the blast 16 analysis that we did. They're aware of the blast analysis that 17 18 we conducted. We've had those conversations on 19 What we will do is we will send a various levels. 20 note or contact our contacts at FERC and let them 21 know that there's a concern, based on Mr. Blanch's 22 2.206 petition. We'll take that action. We can't 23 really request them to take additional action beyond that until we get more detail from our Board. 2.4 25 what our plan is but we will let them know that this

1	is in progress.
2	MR. VAUGHEY: That letter will be public,
3	at least our elected representatives will have access
4	to it?
5	CHAIR MILLER: I'm not sure that we're
6	going to send them a letter. We were planning on a
7	call or an email to our representatives. Like I
8	said, we've been talking at different levels to FERC
9	throughout this process, so I'm confident that FERC
10	knows that there is a petition, and that there is a
11	blast analysis that's been done, that there've been
12	calculations that have been done using the ALOHA
13	code.
14	I can say that with confidence that we've
15	had those discussions with them, but we were planning
16	on a phone call and/or email, however we can send
17	that information to them.
18	MR. BLANCH: Okay, we're all getting a
19	little bit tired here. I appreciate your time,
20	ladies and gentlemen. I'm not sure where we go from
21	here. I'll just reiterate we need an independent
22	risk assessment. Again, thank you for your time, and
23	we look forward to hearing from you. From our end,
24	that's the end of this particular discussion. Thank
25	you.

1	CHAIR MILLER: Thank you, and for all
2	those who participated, we appreciate it, and we look
3	forward to receiving the additional information.
4	MR. BLANCH: Okay, thank you very much.
5	CHAIR MILLER: Thank you, bye bye.
6	(Whereupon, the above-entitled meeting
7	went off the record at 4:04 p.m.)
8	
9	
10	